INTENTION AND INTERTEXT

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AUTHORIAL INTENTION remains an unsolved problem in literary studies, even if it now attracts less direct attention than it used to, and this is one good reason for making it the focus of this year's colloquium.[1] Among students of intertextuality, however, intentionality has always stood at or near the center of discussion. Until recently, the division between intentionalists and anti-intentionalists was rather sharp, extending even to the various nearly-synonymous terms that different scholars used to describe literary resemblance: words like "reference" and "allusion" signaled an intentionalist outlook, while "intertext" (at least in principle) connoted the critic's lack of concern with the author's intention.[2] But we are all intertextualists now, even if we use the word in a very different

[1] In revising this paper I have tried to stay as close as possible to the version delivered in the APA panel. Major additions and departures are signaled as such in the notes. I would like to thank several friends and colleagues for improving the paper through conversations either before or after the panel. W. W. Batstone, quite apart from his role as prime mover of the entire enterprise, has responded to questions in a particularly lucid and focused way. Thanks as well for their various comments to Andrew Fenton, Kathryn Gutzwiller, Ralph Hexter, and Paul Allen Miller. I would also like to acknowledge the contribution of Damien Nelis, which extends beyond the example of his study of Vergil and Apollonius, which I cite below, to a very timely and stimulating paper on systematic allusion, which he gave at the University of Pennsylvania on October 23, 2003, and to dicussion of this paper during its revision.

[2] Treatment of the phenomena in question as possessing a positive element in Roman poetics was an important contribution of Giorgio Pasquali (1942), who coined the phrase "arte allusiva" to stipulate its aesthetic value. The phrase was adopted by others—notably Giuseppe Giangrande and a number of his students—who, however, were less interested in the aesthetics of Roman poetry than in the allusive practices of Alexandrian poets as analogous to, or even as coextensive with, scholarly procedures. Richard Thomas (1982, 1986), emphasizing the continuity between the Alexandrian and Roman poetic cultures, objected to the ludic associations of "allusion" as inappropriate to the precision and seriousness with which these poets cited their predecessors, and proposed the phrase "art of reference" instead, insisting on the scholarly aspect of the poets' practice while retaining a sense of their aesthetic aims as well. All of these scholars assumed or even insisted that the object of study was the result of the poets' active intentions. In the meantime, Gian Biagio Conte (1986) had begun to argue that emphasis on the poet's intentions might be a limiting and even distorting factor, and proposed that critics focus on contact between texts at the point of reception rather than that of production, and so on the activity of the reader rather than on the poet. His phrase "poetic memory" is meant to suggest the process whereby the perception of textual resemblance takes shape in the reader's mind. (In the Italian original of the phrase, "memoria dei poeti," the possessive presumably corresponds to the Latin objective genitive, and not the subjective). Although Conte's conception of poetic memory antedates Thomas's work on reference, Conte's early work became widely known to anglophone scholars only with the publication of an English version in 1986, at about the same time that "intertextuality" began to be used by classicists interested in these phenomena. I discussed these and related issues in greater detail in the introductory chapter of an earlier work (Farrell 1991). The phrase in the subtitle of that work of course indicates what I regarded (and still regard) as the

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sense from its inventor, Julia Kristeva, and indeed from one another.[3] I cannot resist observing the irony in this. Kristeva, having proposed the idea and the term "intertextuality" to denote or suggest a specific property of language that she saw as independent of an intending subject, repudiated the whole business when others began using the word in a different way from the one that *she* had intended.[4] One might have thought that this course of events would have proved her point, but in the end what she intended to say was more important to her than the intertextual chain-reaction that she set off. I take this as just one, and not the most important, indication that the idea of intentionality has some life in it yet.

In these post-poststructuralist days, most critics (of Latin poetry anyway) try to finesse the issue of intention. It seems that we have come to think of the author not as dead but as a kind of recluse whose right to privacy we should respect. So disclaimers of interest in the author's intentions have become common, while many critics nevertheless use intentionalist language as a correlative for that which is valid or invalid in literary interpretation.[5] And with reason: because of course the author *had* intentions, even if we cannot know them fully, and even if those intentions do not define the universe of legitimate meaning that may be found in his or her work.[6]

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importance of Pasquali's emphasis on aesthetics. The title of the introductory chapter, however, is "On Vergilian Intertextuality"—despite the fact that the chapter concludes with an affirmation of my own intentionalist position.

[3] Thomas (1999) has given a collection of his essays—a collection that includes his paper on "the art of reference"—a subtitle that reflects the very general frame of reference that "intertextuality" has acquired. Thomas introduces the papers in this collection as "written in a state of disengagement with specific theoretical approaches," having "a strong focus on the empirical," and showing "little anxiety about the issue of authorial intentionality" (1). In other words, however flexible his terminology may be, Thomas assumes that intention does matter, that it is, within limits, recoverable, and that recovering it is a goal of interpretation. See Kristeva 1969 for her coinage of the word *intertextualité*.

[4] See Edmunds 2001: 8–16 for a lucid account of Kristeva's use of the term "intertextuality." For Kristeva's attempt to replace "intertextuality" with "transposition," see Kristeva 1984: 59–60.

[5] Something like this position is advocated in Hinds 1998. My own title pays tribute to his in recognition of his attempt to theorize explicitly what I would argue are now the most widespread assumptions and procedures among students of Latin poetry. But there is still a wide spectrum of opinion, some of which is organized pointedly as a response to Hinds. Thomas (1999: 1–2 and 6–7, n. 10) takes issue with Hinds's characterization of his work, even as he argues that Hinds's position in *Allusion and Intertext* is, in the end, not so far from his own. On the other hand, Edmunds (2001: xviii–xx, 149–150, 164–169), insisting that the author's intentions are literally unknowable, rejects Hinds's suggestion that authorial intention is "good to think with" even if theoretically indefensible. Edmunds advocates instead an approach to the problem of intertextual relations that is grounded in Jaussian reception theory. For Edmunds, intertextuality is not a property of texts, but a property of reading; the reader interprets and the reader's "community ultimately decides on validity, and [the discipline of] classics is that community for the study of intertextuality in Roman poetry" (168). This is why Edmunds can say that Hinds's "reading is ahead of his theory": because even if he rejects Hinds's theoretical infrastructure, he joins many of us in approving the critical readings that Hinds advances to illustrate his theories.

[6] In the context of the original panel, this may have been one of the most controversial sentences in my paper. I take up the issue of the transhistorical intending subject in an appendix to this version.

The problem, in my opinion, has to do with the existence of a "theory gap." We cannot prove, beginning from first principles, that an interpretation is consistent or inconsistent with an author's intentions. This is certainly an obstacle, but it should not be the end of the story. We cannot fully account, after all, for how any verbal communication, of even a fairly basic sort, takes place. Nevertheless, to speak empirically, it seems to do so. I write expecting you to understand what I write, even expecting you to understand what I mean. And experience suggests that you probably do. The fact that theory cannot fully account for how this happens does not mean that it does not happen, and it would be a mistake to assume that no communication takes place when in fact quite a bit apparently does.[7] *Mutatis mutandis*, some (maybe most) intertextualists proceed along similar lines, assuming, if they can perform a coherent reading of intertextual phenomena, that they have in effect discerned what they were intended to discern.

Is this a valid assumption? Within limits, I believe that it is. Edmunds has written to the contrary, arguing that neither the text nor the poet is or can be a repository of intertextual phenomena.[8] But let us test this idea. When in reading the *Aeneid* we encounter a line such as

<div align="center">

Alcandrumque Haliumque Noëmonaque Prytanimque   (*Aen.* 9.767)

</div>

nothing tells us that the line is borrowed practically intact—transliterated rather than translated—from Homer:

<div align="center">

Ἄλκανδρόν θ' Ἅλιόν τε Νοήμονά τε Πρύτανίν τε   (*Il.* 5.678)

</div>

One does have to be a qualified reader to grasp the fact that Vergil's line is intertextual with Homer. But once this relationship is grasped, one may ask whether the similarity exists only in the mind of the reader and not at all in the text or in the mind of the poet. I am not a statistician, but I think we can assume a very low mathematical probability that any line in any Latin poem would, just by chance, reproduce so accurately any line from any Greek poem. That is to say, the exactitude of this similarity, and the unlikelihood that such a similarity would occur by chance—neither of which factors is merely impressionistic—are both so

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[7] It is on the basis of this remark that Duncan Kennedy in his original response identified the epistemological orientation of my paper as that of eighteenth-century classical objectivism. He was correct to do so: I am, in a certain sense, regarding allusions, authors, and intentions more or less in the same way that David Hume regarded billiard balls, i.e., as things whose behavior could be explained on the basis of empirical observation, but not in terms of any abstract theory. The analogy is of course imperfect, and the philosophical response to Hume may or may not be germane to my argument. Another imperfect analogy, and one that I prefer, involves the distinction between classical and quantum physics. From a quantum point of view, classical physics is an incomplete description of the world; but for some purposes, such as that of designing a bridge, it is perfectly adequate. My position is that a student of literature might make the problem of relationships among texts the occasion to advance understanding at the "quantum" level, at which even quite small theoretical uncertainties about the nature of textual resemblances might be of great importance, but that it is equally legitimate to study effects that appear to depend on general rules or tendencies.

[8] See above, 99, n. 5.

great as to make the line itself an unmistakable intertextual marker.[9] I think we can therefore infer that the text itself, which contains and displays this identity of form, is *per se* a repository of intertextual significance.

By the same token, such a line would seem to me to establish some space for the author as well; for if the textual resemblance did not get there by chance, then it must have got there by someone's will. The author, that is, fashioned it precisely as a resemblance. Any effort to challenge this conclusion can do no more than prove it.[10] The only way I can imagine that would deprive this line of intertextual significance in the mind of the author would be to argue that he stole it from Homer hoping no one would notice. And of course even this is a kind of intertextuality. But despite Vergil's ancient and modern *obtrectatores*, the idea is so much in conflict with everything we are told or can observe about the relationship between Latin and Greek poetry as to be simply risible.

It is still true of course that we do not know why Vergil wished to establish this intertextual link. The allusion may be to the ancient idea that Latin was a dialect of Greek, or to a larger parallelism between the action of the *Aeneid* and that of the *Iliad*, or it could have some other purpose. But let us just acknowledge that an alluding author might work with at least two kinds of intention. First is the intention simply to refer the reader to some other text. The second kind of intention has to do with the larger significance of this reference. At the moment I am speaking of the first kind and the point I want to make is this: because Edmunds and some other theorists are categorical in excluding both text and author from consideration as repositories of intertextual significance, we need to begin by establishing that these elements can have a place in our discussion. This, I believe, our example does.

That is the first main point that I want to make. It is very small; but if it holds, it could be very important. It may be a bit like Lucretius' principle of *clinamen*, the single low-level break in the chain of cause-and-event that opens up enough room for free will to find a place in his otherwise mechanistic system.[11] If we establish

[9] The problem of calculating this probability is mathematically trivial, but determining the relevant parameters of the calculation is much more challenging. I reserve discussion of the problems involved in this type of analysis for another occasion.

[10] This admittedly bold statement has of course been challenged in the discussions that followed the original presentation of the paper. Some of the challenges involve my aforementioned (see above, 99, n. 6) implicit assumption that there is such a thing as a stable, transhistorical intending subject, or at least that the historically determined intending subject characteristic of educated Romans in the classical period was sufficiently like the one that we associate with the modern period. I take up this question in an appendix to this paper. Other challenges, conversely, invoke a more particular version of the the transhistorical intending subject by referring to (a basically Freudian conception of) the unconscious: could Vergil not have reproduced this Homeric line unconsciously? I am not willing to delve so deeply into the poet's consciousness as to suggest how his thinking about this line evolved from the moment he first wrote it to the final stages of his work on the epic, but I would insist that we are talking about a poem that evidently took shape quite gradually over about eleven years, and that under such circumstances the idea that Vergil never realized how closely this line resembled one in Homer is very difficult to credit.

[11] *DRN* 2.251–293 with the comments of Fowler (2002: 301–366, esp. 322–341, and 407–427).

that an intended allusion can exist as a property of text and in the mind of the author, then the hermeneutics that follow need not focus solely on the reader. It may even turn out that the paths of intentionalists and non-intentionalists are not divergent, but that they will eventually converge. I will have a bit more to say about this issue, but first I would like to examine a different characteristic of recent intertextual work.

Quite apart from their views on intention, intertexualists can be divided into two groups on the basis of their methodology. There are those who focus on allusive phenomena as individual points of contact between two texts and there are others who are interested in more extensive, even totalizing, relationships between texts. Theoreticians of intertextuality tend to be, or at least tend to look like members of the former category—and for a simple reason. If one takes the books of either Stephen Hinds or Lowell Edmunds as an example, one sees immediately that both cover a lot of ground. Their business is not to study any one intertextual relationship exhaustively, but to discuss intertextuality in Roman poetry as a general subject. Consequently, both Hinds and Edmunds draw from a wide variety of texts for their illustrations of representative phenomena. Now their opinions about authorial intention are rather different, but at the moment that doesn't matter. My point is that in the kind of wide-ranging argument that each of them makes (each very impressively, in my opinion), it is inevitable— even if both Hinds and Edmunds mention the existence of extensive allusive relationships—that smaller-scale allusions (because they lend themselves to brief, illustrative discussion more readily than do large, complex allusive systems) will be privileged and thus made to seem the principal or most exemplary objects of intertextual analysis and so of intertextual significance as well.

That is one side of the coin. There is a contrasting approach that tends to be associated more with practical criticism than with theory, and that concerns itself not with points of contact, but with more extensive relationships—or rather, with points of contact only as elements within a far more extensive set of relationships. The classic instance of such a relationship is that between Vergil and Homer. If one reads the work of a committed and theoretically-inclined nonintentionalist like Gian Biagio Conte, one encounters the idea that there is an extensive relationship between the *Aeneid* and the Homeric poems; but Conte's discussions of this relationship tend to involve relatively few localized resemblances between specific passages. The import of these comparisons might be large, as in Conte's acute perception that Anchises' words to Aeneas in the underworld recall the opening of the *Odyssey* as well as Catullus' poem to his dead brother; but the relationship between this reminiscence and Vergil's imitation of Homer (or of Catullus) as a whole is suggested rather than analyzed in detail.[12]

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[12] Conte 1986: 32–39. Of course Conte's approach is systematic with respect to his ideas on the "modello codice" and with respect to genre; but he is not concerned to establish in detail the full extent of Vergil's relationship to Homer as "modello esemplare."

Different from this is the approach of G. N. Knauer (1964), who leaves no stone unturned in attempting to show that virtually everything in the *Aeneid* alludes to something in Homer, and that practically every line of the entire *Iliad* and the entire *Odyssey* inspired something in the *Aeneid*.[13] I am not interested now in the kinds of higher interpretation that Conte or Knauer base on their perceptions, but rather in the perceptions themselves. Here I return to my earlier point about two kinds of authorial intention: first, that of fashioning an allusion, and second, whatever is meant by the allusion. Conte (I infer) is not interested in such a distinction, since he argues that allusion is perceived by a reader who should not be concerned with an author's intentions, period. If the reader does not notice an allusion, then for all intents and purposes it does not exist, whether the author intended it to exist or not.[14] Knauer on the other hand devotes a lot of energy to categorizing allusions according to just how closely the passages in question resemble one another and, consequently, to how likely it is that Vergil intended them as part of his design.[15] And of course, one result of Knauer's labors is that many readers consult his lists in order to aid their ability to perceive allusions to Homer in the *Aeneid*, whether they believe Vergil intended any of them or not.

If one takes a pointillist approach, then Knauer's lists are very convenient, since one can easily disagree with him about how likely it is that Vergil intended the reader to notice any specific correspondence in any particular line, or indeed about whether Vergil's intentions should even enter into the discussion. If on the other hand one takes a more holistic approach to the relationship between the *Aeneid* and Homer, one may still disagree with Knauer about this or that item in his lists, but can one really deny that the relationship *as a whole* is evidence of Vergil's intentions?

Here I would recall how Knauer deals with the relationship between more and less obvious points of intertextual contact within the system that he describes. The more obvious kind of allusion, like the line from *Aeneid* 9 that reproduces one from *Iliad* 5, Knauer designates as *Leitzitate* or guide-citations. They are so obvious as to call attention to themselves and to direct the reader to the Homeric passage from which they are borrowed. With this information the reader is in

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[13] Barchiesi (1984) distances himself from Knauer's approach as a whole and, to use Hinds's words (1998: 4, n. 8), "takes his bearings" from Conte, but his analysis shows some concern with systematic aspects of the "modello esemplare" relationship.

[14] I bypass here the idea that Conte (1992: 39–44) calls the "intention of the text," his term for the criterion that guarantees validity in interpretation.

[15] Knauer's (1964: 364) summary of the different sigla that he employs in recording a correspondence make clear his assumption that close resemblance equals authorial intention. At one end of the spectrum are passages where Vergil has reproduced a Homeric passage virtually word for word ("gut wie wörtlich") or "cited" it ("zitiert"); just below that are passages that are almost as close, but that show some variation ("wenn auch variiert"). It is with the next category that explicit reference to Vergil's intentions appear: "Trotz starker Variierung hat Vergil vielleicht an die Homerstelle gedacht;" and then the lowest category: "Sicherlich von Vergil nicht bedacht."

a position to notice additional correspondences that might otherwise have been overlooked.

Knauer's criterion for identifying *Leitzitate* is not intentionality but obviousness.[16] *Leitzitate* may be more obvious than other references, but less obvious ones may be equally intentional. Knauer's lists, it is true, distinguish between correspondences that "count" and those that do not; but Knauer draws this distinction, if I am right, in order to comment on the history of Vergilian allusion-hunting and to sort out the wheat from the chaff. Otherwise, he holds that there is a threshold of significance: if a correspondence falls below that threshold, it is unintentional and does not count, but if it crosses the threshold, it is intentional and takes its place within the grand edifice that is Vergil's program of Homeric allusion.

In my own work on the intertextuality of the *Georgics*, I followed more or less these same assumptions, regarding more obvious allusions as anchoring relationships that were developed by less obvious ones; and I regarded these allusions as mutually reinforcing. By the principle of reinforcement, something that might otherwise be regarded as no allusion at all—such as the perfectly common Latin phrase *sub pedibus*—becomes, in the presence of an emerging pattern of allusion to Lucretius, resonant with intertextual meaning.[17] And in the end, I regarded such allusions as components of a system that Vergil consciously and intentionally built. In this respect—without, I hope, undervaluing the contributions of colleagues who take a different view of authorial intention—I was quite explicit, noting naively and perhaps with a tinge of romanticism that there are times when "a reader simply wonders whether he is really in tune with his author."[18]

In the past few years, my view of this situation has changed, and not because of theoretical objections that have been raised to intentionalist approaches. Obviously if one takes an *a priori* view that intention is unrecoverable, then the idea of more or less consciously intended allusions, or of doubtful correspondences reinforcing one another in some way so as to take the interpreter closer to what · the author intended, has no place at all. But our inability to account in theory for a phenomenon does not mean that the phenomenon does not occur; and, in the

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[16] This is how I put it in the original version of the paper. On reflection I believe that the point still holds. It is true, however, that some correspondences are very close, but not at all obvious: Knauer himself discusses the relationship between Amata's final speech to Turnus (*Aen.* 12.56–63) and Hecuba's final speech to Hector (*Il.* 22.82–89), which consists not in similar diction or content, but in the fact that both speeches occupy similar positions in the plots of the respective poems *and* are both exactly eight lines long (Knauer 1964: 291, n. 1; for further examples, see 537, s.v. "Reden"). But this is not a *Leitzitat*, a term that Knauer reserves for ringing quotations; it is the ostentatiousness of these quotations or citations that "guides" the reader towards further and less obvious correspondences. Knauer's clearest statement concerning the role of *Leitzitate* in the economy of Vergil's Homeric program is found at 145–147.

[17] Gale 2000: 8, n. 20.

[18] Farrell 1991: 22.

hope of making some progress in this area, I have attempted earlier in this paper to establish a foothold or a beachhead for at least one kind of allusion that exists within the text itself as a record of the author's will. With this anchor, I believe, it is possible to begin discovering a network of intertextuality that does correspond with sufficient accuracy to the author's intentions.

I believe that the anchor is pretty secure, but for the sake of argument, let us suppose that it is not.[19] Does the whole edifice come tumbling down? I think not, and for the following reason. My transliterated line probably represents the limit (or one limit) of how closely a line of Latin poetry can resemble a Greek original. But it is certainly not the only line of the *Aeneid* that closely resembles one of Homer. (We need not confine the discussion to lines and other strictly lexical and metrical phenomena, but for convenience I will take this path and ask you to find the necessary analogies to translate the argument into whatever terms you prefer.)[20] There are many places where Vergil's text resembles Homer's very closely indeed. Now, for the sake of the argument, let us grant what will be in any case true for some fraction of these *loci similes*, namely, that any one of them either may or may not have been intended as an allusion. Let us suppose that there is even some possibility, even if it is vanishingly small, that my transliterated line could have come about accidentally and unintentionally. By the same token, both for this and for every other example, there is also a possibility that it was intended. We do not know the numerical value of each probability; some will be high and some low. My point is that they cannot all be accidental; because even if it is possible that some very close correspondences between two texts arise by accident, the possibility seems vanishingly small that out of ten, twenty, or a hundred such correspondences, all of them came about by chance. By this principle, even if I cannot guarantee you that any given similarity represents an intentional allusion, I believe I can say with confidence that a large number of such occurrences bespeaks an underlying intent.

This observation takes us back to Knauer's threshold. Let us assume that we are trying to establish what the alluding author intended and that it is actually possible to do so. Is it also the case that this is all we should do? Or is there room for finding significance within an intricate allusive system that was not foreseen by the author, and that is perhaps even contrary to what we may justly regard as his intentions?

I believe again that the answer is yes, and the basis of this belief is again the very vastness of the allusive systems that we are discussing. The *Aeneid* as described by Knauer is an allusive system of astounding complexity and detail.

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[19] This paragraph was omitted from the original version of the paper due to constraints of time, but it did form part of my original conception of the argument.

[20] I have already mentioned one type of correspondence that is based on numbers of lines in a speech or episode (above, 104, n. 16). For a related type based on stichometry, see Knauer 1964: 131, 137, n. 1, 175, n. 3, 261, n. 1, 298, 301; Scodel and Thomas 1984; Smith 1990: 458–460; Morgan 1999: 23–27, 223–229.

It comprises hundreds of potential individual allusions, so many that the idea of many individual allusions loses some of its force, because it is arbitrary in a situation like this to locate allusion solely within individual words and lines. Yet in accordance with the principle of reinforcement, even though I could not prove to you that Vergil intended this or that allusion (because it might have come about by chance), I feel very secure in stating that several hundred points of contact were not generated by chance.

So I have tried to make the case that intention of at least a general sort can be established as a formal property of texts under at least two circumstances: first, in the case of similarities so close and so distinctive that they are unlikely to be the result of chance; and second, in cases involving similarities of which perhaps none is so exact as to put the matter of intention beyond doubt, but that are so great in number that they cannot all be the result of chance. In such cases the analytical possibilities that present themselves to the critic are almost bound to be greater than any single point of contact can create and for this reason my own preference lies with the study of what I think of as allusive systems.

The final question I want to raise has to do with the nature of these systems. How far does the principle of reinforcement extend? If I can find a hundred or more potentially intended correspondences, do they all reinforce one another so that they must all be intended? I do not know whether this was Knauer's assumption, but I infer that something like it was. The many individual instances that he found himself or excavated from the tradition of Vergil commentary since the Renaissance added up in his system to a colossal and intentional system of allusion. It would have been difficult to make this argument about practically any other poet, but of course Vergil enjoys an almost superhuman reputation regarding his mastery of even the most intricate and minute poetic effects. And I at least have always felt that his intertextual poetics are more exceptional than exemplary. Vergil, we may admit, wrote this way, but perhaps only in the *Aeneid* and only with reference to Homer. Who else ever did anything like it on such a scale?

The recent publication of Damien Nelis's book on Vergil and Apollonius calls this assumption into question; or rather, it undermines the assumption entirely.[21] Using techniques adapted from Knauer, Nelis shows, convincingly to my mind, that the *Aeneid* in its entirety alludes to the *Argonautica* in its entirety in much the same way as it alludes (à la Knauer) to the entire *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. Not only that, but Nelis shows that Vergil's Homeric program and his Apollonian program are interdependent—which means that the complexity of Vergil's overall allusive program is not only doubled, but perhaps amplified many more times.

It is, then, this neo-Knauerian study that challenges my earlier assumptions. So long as Knauer's study was unique, it seemed possible to judge it in terms rather different from those that applied to other intertextual study. Once it is

[21] Nelis 2001.

seen, however, that Vergil's Homeric *agon* was, so to speak, repeatable, certain adjustments seem called for. Before Nelis I would have asked: how can the relationship that Knauer finds between the *Aeneid* and the Homeric poems not be the product of an intending author? Now, faced with the vastly greater intricacy revealed by Nelis's study, I ask instead: is it really possible that everything revealed by this analysis can have been foreseen by even the most brilliant poetic mind? In fact, Nelis raises the question of whether we really even know the full extent of Vergil's allusive program. Remember that, on his analysis, Vergil's Apollonian program does not merely exist *in addition to* a Homeric one; the two are closely interconnected.[22] In view of this fact, we really have to ask what other poems might be involved. Where does it stop? We had Homer for centuries before anyone explained the full extent and intricacy of Vergil's Homeric program. It then took almost forty years before it was shown that this program extends to Apollonius as well. If we looked elsewhere, what else might we find? And this is to speak only of authors whose works survive, and only of the epic genre: if we had all of Greek literature, how many studies on the Knauer/Nelis model would be adequate to describe Vergil's allusive program with regard to earlier Greek and Latin poetry?

Merely to ask such questions invites the onset of vertigo. But this reaction is actually quite useful. Of course the mind recoils from the thought of a library full of books entitled, "The *Aeneid* and Homer," "The *Aeneid* and Apollonius," "The *Aeneid* and Ennius," and so forth. At the same time, however, I at least have no doubt that many such books could be written. And this puts the question of totalizing allusion in quite a different light. Now we must ask: was it possible even for Vergil to have controlled this mass of material to the point of foreseeing everything that we have found in his program of allusion to earlier epic poets?

Here the answer seems to me to be "no"; and if it is, we have to conceive of the frontier between the intended and the unintended in somewhat different terms. When the extent of potential significance is so vast, the relationship between obvious and less obvious allusions must be seen in a different way. I do think that we can continue to take particularly obvious allusions as guides to the author's intentions: as *Leitzitate*, to use Knauer's term. But it no longer seems reasonable to suppose that all the less obvious allusions that we might be able to relate to these guide-citations were foreseen by the author, and thus cross the threshold of intentionality. Instead, I see the process of assessing these allusions as unfolding according to a procedure that the author sets in motion, but that he cannot fully control: Vergil, that is, makes it clear that he invites intertextual reading, and he even specifies some of the rules that govern interpretation of this sort. But I do not see that we can grant him full control over the process. In a certain sense, one might say that he created a text that not only trains us to become competent

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[22] Nelis (2001: 7) makes the point, which is then abundantly illustrated throughout the subsequent pages of his study.

readers and interpreters, but also permits and even encourages different readers to draw different conclusions about levels of significance higher than that of whether an allusion is intended or not.

At this point one might ask how my perspective differs from those of others who locate intertextual significance in the reader rather than in the author or the text. I obviously have no time for an adequate response, but I remind you of my first main point, in which I argued that there are at least some allusions that are so obvious in their formal characteristics that they do ground allusion in the text and in the mind of an intending author. Second, I appeal to an approach that regards allusions not as individual points of contact, but as elements within an extensive intertextual system. Both of these aspects, I believe, have the potential to bring us much closer to the author's intentions than a pointillist approach. These are the main issues that I would like to raise for discussion, while acknowledging that the ultimate question of how to establish validity in this or any other kind of interpretation remains, so far, unsolved.[23]

APPENDIX

All of the other papers presented in this panel concerned themselves with the question of whether the intending subject of modern critical and psychological discourse can be identified or securely correlated with some ancient analogue. Simply stated, the question is whether the ancients resembled us in their general psychological outlook, and in particular whether we can assume that they had intentions in the way that the word is normally used today.

I will not try to go into this question in anything like a thoroughgoing way, but I will state that the burden of proof, in my opinion, is squarely on those who deny

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[23] This conclusion leaves us in a position that seems to me not dissimilar from Edmunds's, namely, that the validity of much intertextual analysis would have to be determined by agreement within a community of qualified interpreters. But I believe that the scope of this community to regulate meaning is smaller than Edmunds suggests, and also that it does stand in a specific relationship to intentions that are written into texts by their authors, as I have tried to show. For the sake of the argument, I suppose that, according to Edmunds, a medieval interpretation of the Fourth Eclogue as predicting the birth of Jesus Christ would have to be considered valid in the tenth century, in that it would (so far as we know) have been endorsed by the community of qualified interpreters alive at that time, just as it is invalid now because it is currently not so endorsed. I would argue, however, that it never was and never can be a valid interpretation, even if its historical and cultural importance are great, because of characteristics that inhere in the text and in its relation to other texts. Identifications of the baby whose birth the poem foretells either as the child of Antonius and Octavia, or as that of Asinius Pollio, or as no specific child, are and always were equally valid and may always be so, if we never gain further information that would help us decide among them. And identification of the poem's addressee as Pollio is the only valid interpretation, for reasons that have nothing to do with scholarly consensus, but that have only to do with evidence. Any idea that the poem was addressed to anyone else would have been, in any period, merely wrong—just as wrong as the grammarian Q. Remmius Palaemon's (one hopes) jocular citation of the Third Eclogue (where a shepherd named Palaemon acts as judge of a rustic singing contest) as evidence of Vergil's prediction that the grammarian would one day be a great critic (Suet. *De Gram.* 23).

the basic similarity between ancient and modern intention. In reading ancient literature, one is struck more by similarities in this regard than by differences; and these similarities are not only apparent or due to a misguided tendency simply to understand ancient texts according to anachronistic modern assumptions. In fact, the similarities that one finds are often specific and quite detailed.

As an example of what I mean, consider the following, very famous passage from Cicero's defense of M. Caelius Rufus (*Pro Caelio* 32):

quid est aliud quod nos patroni facere debeamus, nisi ut eos, qui insectantur, repellamus? Quod quidem facerem vehementius, nisi intercederent mihi inimicitiae cum istius mulieris viro—fratre volui dicere; semper hic erro.

What else should we advocates do other than repell those who harrass [our clients]? And I would do this more vigorously, if it weren't for the quarrel between myself and her husband—brother, I meant to say. (I always make that mistake!)

What is Cicero doing here? He claims to be stating an intention: he meant to say *fratre*, not *viro*. It is a mistake that he makes all the time. He makes it, we infer, because Clodia, the woman in question, was rumored to have had an incestuous relationship with her brother, P. Clodius Pulcher, who was a great enemy of Cicero. Instead of calling Clodius her brother, therefore, Cicero "accidentally" calls him her husband. Of course there is nothing accidental about it: rather it is a clever way of introducing through innuendo a point that would be embarrassing to the key figure behind Caelius' prosecution.

So it's a joke. This is interesting for a couple of reasons. First, Cicero's "mistake" is the performance of what we would call a Freudian slip.[24] Cicero of course did not know it as such, and some would recommend that we avoid the term, since Freud would not articulate his ideas about such errors until almost two thousand years after Cicero delivered his speech.[25] Nevertheless, it is difficult to deny the basic similarity between what Cicero says and what we know as a Freudian slip. Freud's argument is that these slips are caused by the unconscious,

[24] Freud himself (1901) considered such slips to be a species of *Fehleistung* (literally "faulty action"), which was initially rendered in the English translation (Freud 1914) as *parapraxis*. My thanks to Professor Douglas Davis of Haverford College for the reference.

[25] In his original response, Duncan Kennedy (above, 147) made reference to Bruno Latour's well-known constructivist remark on the discovery by French scientists that the mummy of Pharaoh Rameses II, who died in 1213 B.C.E., contained the tuberculosis bacterium: "How could he pass away due to a bacillus discovered by Robert Koch in 1882?" Latour's question is pertinent from the point of view of the thirteenth century B.C.E., in that (so far as we know) everything about the way in which Rameses and his contemporaries understood his illness is different from our understanding of it. For that matter, as Susan Sontag (1978) convincingly demonstrates, the popular understanding of tuberculosis was very different in the nineteenth century C.E. from what it is today. Koch's discovery of the *mycobacterium tuberculosis* was no doubt instrumental in changing the earlier nineteenth-century attitude to what it would become. It did not, however, create the bacterium or the disease that it produces in people, which Rameses' mummy proves has been in existence for at least thirty-three centuries. Cicero's "Freudian" slip is a slightly different but, as I argue, comparable case.

often in response to something that can readily be found in the context within which the slip occurs. Cicero does not refer to the unconscious or name the kind of error that he makes, but he clearly pretends to have said the wrong thing *without meaning to* for reasons that the context makes perfectly clear. Not only that, but it is obvious that he is joking, and that he expects his audience to understand exactly what he is doing. This means that we have to assume that Cicero could expect his audience to be sufficiently familiar with this phenomenon to recognize it as a perfectly typical kind of human behavior.

Now, it is reasonable to suggest that we should not speak unthinkingly of Cicero's "Freudian" slip: the epithet is too laden with meaning specific to a particular view of the world to apply it to Cicero's thought processes with no further comment. But on the other hand, this little episode gives evidence that Cicero's conception not only of his own intentions, but also of a pathology of intention that was certainly not named until almost two thousand years after his death and one that might have been thought peculiar to the modern intending subject, was actually very similar to our own. In addition, he was sufficiently confident that this conception was shared by his contemporaries that he was able to joke about it in addressing a jury in a trial for attempted murder. Under such circumstances, I feel few qualms in supposing that the intending subject of Cicero's and of Vergil's day was sufficiently similar to that of today, to support the arguments advanced in this paper.[26]

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[26] I am grateful to Professor Douglas Davis of Haverford College for discussing this point with me.

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